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STATE FOR NEA/FO--CATALANO, ISN/RA--NEPHEW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/27  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [IR](#) [CI](#) [BR](#) [AR](#) [CU](#)  
SUBJECT: CHILE SHARES US CONCERNS ON IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

REF: STATE 120288

CLASSIFIED BY: Urban Carol, DCM, State, US Embassy Santiago; REASON:  
1.4(B)

¶1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche to Alvaro Guzman of the MFA's International and Human Security Office on November 25. Guzman said that Chile was in agreement with US concerns and that, in general, Chile adheres closely to the positions of the IAEA and UNSC. Chile feels that Iran has not been transparent or honest in dealing with the nuclear issues, and Chile believes that the UNSC should take more concrete actions to pressure Iran to make their nuclear activities public. Chile does not have any suggestions as to what concrete actions might be useful.

¶2. (C) Guzman also noted that Chile had been working within the Non-Aligned Movement to try to persuade the group to modify the language in a draft resolution on the issue. The current language is very sympathetic to Iran and Chile would like to see the organization take a harder line. However, Cuba is one of the main protagonists in the drafting process, and is not supportive of the change. Guzman anticipated that, despite Chile's best efforts, the language would remain relatively conciliatory towards Iran. In that case, Chile will make a public reservation to explain why it does not support the text.

Worries that Brazil is Cozying Up to Iran--Can Argentina Help?

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¶3. (C) Guzman said that his office is concerned about possible Brazilian-Iranian nuclear cooperation, and noted that Iranian president Ahmadinejad is currently in Brazil. Brazil is seeking an avenue to promote its authority as a rising leader, and may see an opportunity in stepping in to this issue given the difficulties that the P5+1 is having securing Iran's engagement. Although he believed that Brazil was only likely to offer civil--not military--nuclear cooperation, Guzman nonetheless found the prospect worrying.

¶4. (C) Guzman said that Chile has not talked to Brazil about its concerns, and noted that Ambassador Alfredo Labbe, the head of the MFA's International and Human Security Office, was very frustrated by the Chilean Embassy in Brazil's lack of engagement on security issues. However, even if Chile were to voice its concerns to Brazil, Guzman cautioned that they may have little effect as Chile is a small country. Guzman suggested that Argentina could possibly

help pressure Brazil to distance itself from Iran and its nuclear ambitions. Argentina and Brazil have the most advanced nuclear technology in Latin America, Guzman said, and are signatories to a bilateral nuclear agreement, the Argentine-Brazilian Agreement on Accountability and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

15. (C) Comment. Guzman was surprisingly frank in his comments, particularly on Brazil. His comment probably accurately reflects thinking within his office, but Chile has other interests in Brazil which it will have to balance against its concerns with possible Brazil/Iran nuclear cooperation. We suspect other Foreign Ministry officials, including those from Guzman's office, might be more circumspect in their description of Brazil's relations with Iran.  
End Comment.  
SIMONS